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In the Supreme Court 
Of the State of Utah 
ROBERT B. S\V" ANER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION MORTGAGE COMPA·NY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 6234 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against 
appellant and in favor of plaintiff, and the facts over 
which the litigation resulting in such appeal arose are 
contained in the following: 
STATEMENT 
The plaintiff and respondent, Robert B. Swaner, is 
a young man 22 years of age venturing into the contract-
ing and building field. His experience consists of re-
_modeling and building some eight or nine houses, and 
the defendant and appellant is a corporation engaged, 
among other things, in financing building loans and se-
curing Federal Housing Administration insurance on 
such loans. 
In the month of July, 1938 Swaner applied to de-
fendant for Federal Housing Administration insurance 
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commitments upon a loan for $4,000.00, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the lOth Avenue property, and asked the de-
fendant to provide for appraisals, credit reports, initial 
service charges, recording fees, abstracting and fire in-
surance, in order that such application would in all re-
spects meet the terms and conditions and comply with the 
rules and regulations of said Federal Housing Adminis-
tration. Thereafter, on or about the 20th of July, 1938 
the Federal Housing Administration approved such loan, 
subject to the qualification that George B. Swaner, fath-
er of the plaintiff, should be a co-signer on the note and 
mortgage evidencing and insuring the payment of such 
loan, and the note and mortgage duly secured as request-
ed were executed and delivered on the 22nd day of 
July, 1938. 
Thereafter, Swaner began work on the property de-
scribed in such mortgage and the defendant, in compli-
ance with the terms and conditions of its contract, ad-
vanced money upon the order of the plaintiff to material 
men and laborers as such improvements proceeded, which 
were approved by the Federal Housing Administration, 
until the advancements had approximated $2,800.00. 
On or about September 15, 1938 Swaner made ap-
plication to the defendant to obtain three additional 
Feder~l Housing Administration loans for $3,000.00 each. 
Each loan was to be evidenced by the note of the plaintiff 
and be secured by a mortgage on the property described 
by plaintiff in his application. Immediately defendant 
and appellant presented such applications to the F. H. A. 
people and, at plaintiff's request, made advancements and 
expenditures in his behalf. On November 6, 1938, as the 
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result of its efforts in such behalf, the Federal Housing 
Administration approved one loan upon the property 
described in plaintiff's complaint (see abstract, page 2) 
and hereinafter referred to as the 16th East property, 
conditioned that George B. Swaner and Charlotte L. 
·swaner, father and mother of the plaintiff, should be-
come co-signers thereon ; and on the 11th day of N ovem-
ber, 1938 the note and mortgage so required were made 
and executed under the terms and conditions required by 
the Federal Housing Administration, among which were· 
that the construction should be according to F. H. A. 
requirements and should pass inspection by the Federal 
Housing Administration. In addition, at the time said 
application was made, the defendant was required to and 
did make certain expenditures in behalf of plaintiff and 
was required to and did carry insurance upon the im-
provements upon the property. 
Shortly after the note and mortgage last above de-
scribed were made and executed and before any work or 
improvements were made upon such 16th East property 
by plaintiff, defendant was advised that plaintiff was 
failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
Federal Housing Administration rules and regulations 
in that he was not keeping the property referred to in the 
note and mortgage of July 22, 1938 the lOth avenue prop-
erty free from debt, except for the mortgage above re-
ferred to, and that he was failing to keep the property 
free from claims and that he hadn't paid accruing bills 
thereon, and that several material men and mechanics 
had already filed liens against such property; that he 
was failing to pay his wages and that complaint had 
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been made to the Industrial Commission of Utah by la-
borers who had not been paid. That thereupon defendant 
advised plaintiff of the circumstances and plaintiff imme-
diately informed defendant that he would at once put the 
first above described loan back into condition so that it 
might be finally approved by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration. As the result of such representation, this 
defendant made additional advances on the construction 
of the lOth Avenue property, the last advancement of 
which occurred on the 23rd of December, 1938. Plaintiff, 
however, failed to keep his agreement, and there was 
much difficulty encountered with respect to the first loan 
and this defendant found that plaintiff was a bad credit 
risk, and it became desirable to discontinue the relation-
s·hip. 
Sometime prior to December, 1938 plaintiff began 
construction under the mortgage dated November 14, 
1938. In the meantime, at the request of plaintiff, de-
fendant had expended in behalf of plaintiff on such mort-
gage and Federal Housing Administration commitment 
16th East property the appraisal fee of $10.00, the credit 
report of $6.00, a recording fee of $7 .10, an abstract fee 
of $5.00, and had placed fire insurance oil the property 
under the terms of the Federal Housing Administration 
commitment, with the loss payable to defendant and its 
assigns as its interest appeared, and had paid therefor 
the sum of $21.00. 
When defendant found that plaintiff was not com-
plying with his agreement on the transaction designated 
as· the lOth Avenue property, it indicated to the plaintiff 
that it was no longer interested in doing business with the 
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plaintiff. The plaintiff made demands upon defendant 
and appellant for advancements for expenditures incur-
red by him with respect to the property described as the 
16th East property. 
That on or about the time the mortgage of November 
14, 1938, the 16th East property, was signed and executed, 
defendant agreed with plaintiff that advancement would 
be made approved Federal Housing Administration in-
spection, as follows: 10% when the first floor joists were 
on, 15% when the roof was done, $20.00 when the house 
was ready for plastering, 25% when it was ready for dec-
oration, and the balance when it had passed the final 
F. H. A. inspection. 
During the period between the time when defendant 
had called plaintiff's attention to the fact that he was 
not complying with the terms of the F. H. A. on the lOth 
Avenue property and the 21st of December, 1938, plain-
tiff made demand upon defendant for advancements on 
both properties. With respect to the 16th East property, 
over which the present litigation arises, the defendant 
and appellant answered that there had been no F. H. 
A. approval sufficient to justify making such advance-
ments. Plaintiff persisted and finally an evidence of 
inspection by the F. H. A., Exhibit No. "1," was re-
ceived by defendant and a copy of Exhibit "3" was plac-
ed upon the property and another sent to this defendant. 
Appellant refused to make advancements further, and 
thereupon the plaintiff Swaner demanded that the mort-
gages on the 16th East property be released, and to this 
demand defendant and appellant consented and agreed, 
insisting, however, that it should be re-imbursed for the 
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expenditures it had made for recording, inspection, serv-
ice and insurance. Plaintiff refused to make these pay-
ments or any part thereof and brought this action for 
cancellation of the mortgages and for certain damages, 
including $2,000.00 for personal humiliation, embarrass-
ment and mental distress, $10.00 for demurrage charges, 
$40.00 for discounts unrealized, $250.00 for damage to the 
building from the elements, and $200.00 attorney's fees. 
The case was heard by a jury which, acting in an advisory 
capacity, answered ten interrogatories propounded by 
the trial judge and rendered an advisory verdict grant-
ing cancellation of the mortgage and certain damages, 
amounting to $25.00 for loss of value due to the elements, 
$40.00 for unrealized discounts, $10.00 for demurrage 
charges and $200.00 attorney's fees. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Supplemental assignments of error have been filed 
and served as follows: 
12. The Court committed error prejudicial to ap-
pellant when he sustained plaintiff's objection to the fol-
lowing question: ''You didn't pay those expenses~'' 
(Tr. 100.) 
13. The Court committed error prejudicial to the 
defendant and appellant when it found, as it did, in para-
graph 6 of its findings of fact, that plaintiff thereafter 
demanded of the defe'ndant that it release the said mort-
gages of record and surrender to the plaintiff the said 
promissory note ''which the defendant likewise refused 
to do" for the reason that there is no evidence in the 
record to justify such finding. (Tr. 56.) 
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ARGUMENT 
Heretofore appellant has assigned errors committed 
by the Court during the trial of these proceedings, and for 
the convenience of the Court this argument will be di-
vided first into a discussion of the facts, and second, a 
discussion of the law, and thus all of its assignments of 
error will be considered. 
The Court has found that the defendant below, ap-
pellant here, had refused to release the mortgage on the 
property referred to as the 16th East property, which 
are the only mortgages with which we are concerned di-
rectly in this action. (See abstract, page 20, particularly 
findings six and ten.) It is the contention of the appellant 
that no such testimony will be found in the record. The 
amended answer of appellant (abstract page 11) contains 
a paragraph numbered 7 which reads as follows : 
"Upon receipt of such notification by defend-
ant, plaintiff demanded the release of the mort-
gage described in plaintiff's complaint. Upon such 
demand being made upon it, this defendant con-
sented that such release of mortgage be made, and 
informed the plaintiff that upon payment by him 
to it of the expenses and outlay made by it on his 
behalf, in connection with such loan, that said 
loan would be immediately released.'' 
Reference to plaintiff's answer to defendant's counter-
claim shows that in making such answer the plaintiff 
set forth the following: (Abstract page 15.) 
''Answering paragraph 7 plaintiff admits 
that he demanded the release of the mortgage de-
scribed in plaintiff's complaint and that the de-
fendant refused to release said mortgage, except 
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upon condition that the plaintiff pay to the de-
fendant certain alleged costs and expenses claimed 
by the defendant to have been incurred by it in 
connection with said loan, and in this connection 
plaintiff denies that the defendant was entitled 
to any such payment of costs and expenses, as a 
condition for the release of said mortgage.'' 
The testimony of the plaintiff at page 30 of the ab-
stract shows the following upon cross examination of the 
plaintiff: 
Question: N o,~l at the time you made demand 
for the release of this mortgage, the defendant 
told you that it 'vould release immediately if you 
would pay certain expenses it had incurred, didn't 
"t ~ l . 
Answer : Yes. 
It is true that there are certain conclusions of this 
witness at various places in the record, but at no place is 
there a denial of the fact that the defendant at all times 
stood ready to release such mortgages upon payment by 
.the plaintiff to the defendant of the costs and expenses 
which it had incurred in his behalf, and it is undisputed 
in the record that the defendant was perfectly willing 
to release the plaintiff from the contract entered into on 
November 14, 1938, and that it would discharge the mort-
gages upon being made "Thole on its expenditures in his 
behalf. Upon this question, it would seem that a lengthy 
discussion would not be needed because the record bears 
out the contention of the defendant and appellant without 
dispute, and the good faith of the appellant is evidenced 
in its ·willingness expressed by it to release upon getting 
.back its actual outlay. And what were the expenses 
whieh had been incurred by it in behalf of the plaintiff: 
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Recording, abstract fees, Federal Housing Administra-
tion fees and fire insurance. It is true that the Court 
struck out of appellant's pleading the items above re-
ferred to and 'vould allo"'" no proof on the subject, but 
this has been assigned as error. Appellant feels that the 
Court 'Yas in error· in striking this portion of its plead-
ing for the reason that these expenditures were made by 
defendant at the request of plaintiff and for plaintiff's 
benefit in conformity with the rules and regulations of 
the Federal Housing Administration, and no commitment 
could be secured from said administration without these 
expenditures or ag-reement to make them when called 
upon. The mortgage had to be recorded, the abstract of 
title had to be prepared, and the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration appraisal fees had to be paid; and certainly, 
after the improvements were made upon the property, 
insurance had. to be carried thereon. 
Some question was raised that no tender of the in-
surance policy had been made to plaintiff and hence no 
liability. Of course this must immediately appear to be 
without foundation, because the policy was issued and 
plaintiff knew it. The policy was made to the mortgagor 
for the benefit of the mortgagee as its interest appeared, 
and it must be manifest that when the mortgagee had 
furnished no money upon the mortgage its interest would 
be nothing, and if a fire had occurred the mortgagor 
'vould have been the sole beneficiary. Why, then, should 
not the mortgagor pay for the insurance policy which 
was made entirely for his benefit and which would pro-
tect him at all times from its issue and even during the 
trial of this cause f The mortgagee was in absolute 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
good faith in asking for the return of the money expended 
by it for the benefit of the plaintiff, and the Court's 
refusal to allow proof of such obligation and his action 
in striking that portion of the defendant's answer and 
counterclaim 'vas prejudicial in the extreme to defend-
ant. 
Appellant feels that at no time during its relations 
with the plaintiff in connection with the 16th East mort-
gage was there ever a compliance by the plaintiff with 
the rules and regulations of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and with the agreement entered into by the 
plaintiff and defendant which would entitle the plain-
tiff to any advancements whatever. It is alleged by ap-
pellant ·and testified to again and again by the plaintiff 
that his loan and any advancements were to be subject 
to the rules and regulations of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration and subject to inspections made by that in-
stitution. The record shows (see plaintiff's complaint, 
abstract page 2 and his testimony, abstract page 27) that 
the plaintiff was to receive money, "10% when the first 
floor joists were on, 15% when the roof was completed 
* * * " 
.... c\n inspection was made by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration on or about the 21st of December, 1938 and 
a record of such inspection was made and sent to ap-
pellant (see Exhibit "1") and a photostatic copy of such 
exhibit is made a part of this brief. A careful examina-
tion of the exhibit will show that there was an objection 
to the concrete which never yet has been approved, at 
least no evidence indicates such approval, that certain 
portions of the construction were approved but it will 
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be noted that the floor and other construction above the 
foundation is specifically marked as unacceptable, though 
indicated as partially complete or in progress . 
.. At the same time that this inspection was made, 
there appears to have been a piece of paper left at the 
building 'vhich is marked Exhibit "3". A photostatic 
cut of that document is also a part of this brief, and an 
examination of the document will show that that refers 
to exhibit 1 which sets the defects and indicates just what 
is required and expressly sho,vs that approval is subject 
to the correction of the defective work, and there is abso-
lutely no other testimony in the record which shows that 
then or at any time since has the F. H. A. ever approved 
that defective work. It is true that plaintiff says the 
floor was completed, but it is submitted that such state-
ment is a self-serving declaration and can mean nothing 
when a strict compliance on his part would be required 
to entitle him to any advancement under the contract 
I 
between himself and appellant. 
Edward 0. Anderson, a witness on behalf of the de-
fendant, was called and qualified himself as Chief Arch-
itectural Supervisor in charge of the documents, records 
and files of the F. H. A. corporation, and he recognized 
the two exhibits herein referred to. Exhibit '' 1'' is 
dated the same day that Exhibit "3" is dated, and it is 
clear that Exhibit "3" is but a documentary evidence 
that on that day a certain inspection was made which is 
clearly evidenced by Exhibit "1," and it is inconceiv-
able that Exhibit '' 3'' would have the effect of more wide-
ly approving the work done on the property than Exhibit 
'' 1 '' which carries the demand for the correction of de-
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fective work, and on which the F. H. A. would hold ap-
pellant on its obligation to provide properly constructed 
security. 
It is submitted that with the inspection evidenced 
by Exhibits "1" and "3," no such compliance with the 
requirements of the contract between plaintiff and ap-
pellant had been had as would entitle plaintiff to an ad-
vancement of money thereunder. 
The question of the $25.00 general damages which 
was allowed to stand by the Court, after motion for new 
trial had been made and presented, is in appellant's 
opinion entirely without foundation or justification. The 
only evidence supporting it in any sense is the testimony 
of the plaintiff himself, and the wild judgments of the 
witness A. J. Dean, who by his own testimony is a cement 
man and is certainly not qualified to make judgments of 
the type he was called upon to testify to. Witness his 
testimony about the rusty nails (abstract page 36) and 
compare that testimony with the facts presented in the 
testimony of 0. C. Nielson (abstract page 45) and see 
Exhibit '' 5, '' and then determine what reliance could be 
put on even a guess by such witness. It is submitted that 
no proof of any type worthy of the name was submitted 
to substantiate the $25.00 damage, and the judgment 
of the experts long in the building business, Buehner and 
Nielson, clearly demonstrates that the building had not 
suffered at all. In fact, careful reading of their testi-
mony will indicate that the drying out process that the 
building was subjected to was really an advantage rather 
than a detriment. There is no evidence upon which find-
ings 6, 7 and 10 can be justified. 
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One of the noYel features presented in this case was 
the allowance by the Court of $200.00 attorney's fees for 
the bringing of this action. The general rule is that no 
recovery can be had as damages for costs and expenses 
of litigation or expenditure of counsel fees, unless spe-
cial provision is made for such allowance (a) by stat_ute, 
(b) by contract, or (c) as exemplary damages growing 
out of wrongful and malicious acts and in some cases out 
of wanton or malicious injury or gross negligence or 
fraud. It is the belief of the appellant that none of these 
prerequisites are to be found in the case at bar. 
In 29 Fed. 2nd 78, the Court says : 
"No right of action for damages exists at 
common law for failure to satisfy mortgage or to 
release or discharge a lien or other claim against 
property.'' 
The State of Utah has not been called upon to pass 
on this question directly, but it does have a statute, Sec-
tion 78-3-8, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, with refer-
ence to the release of mortgages, which reads as follows: 
,, 'If the mortgagee ;fails to discharge or release 
any mortgage after the same has been fully satis-
field, he shall be liable to the mortgagor for dou-
ble the damages resulting from such failure. Or 
the mortgagor may bring an action against the 
mortgagee to compel the discharge or release of 
the mortgage after the same has been satisfied; 
and the judgment of the Court must be that the 
mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and 
pay the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all dam-
ages resulting from such failure.'' 
The above quotation is the only expression in the Utah 
Statutes with respect to attorney's fees in connection 
with mortgages. 
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An early Utah decision held such a penalty statute 
unconstitutional. 
Openshaw vs. Haflin, 68 Pac. 138, 24 Utah 
426. 
In Utah the question of attorney's fees as damages 
has been before the Court but rarely, and for the most 
part these pronouncements grew out of attachment suits. 
vVhile it cannot be said that such cases are directly in 
point, yet it does appear to appellant that the expression 
of the Court does indicate clearly that unless attorney's 
fees are provided for by statute, not only in attachment 
cases but in others, this Court is rather definitely on 
record against it. 
St.. Joseph Stock Yards Co. vs. Love, et al, 
195 Pac. 305, 57 Utah 450 (see especially pages 
463-465) wherein the Court says : 
'' vV e do not wish to be understood as hold-
ing, or even as intimating, that in a case where the 
":--hole defense is directed against the attachment 
and to show that the same was wrongful, as was 
the case in Whitney vs. Brownewell, supra, and in 
similar cases, attorney's fees may not be allowed, 
but what we contend for is that where there is 
no motion assailing the attachment or no plea in 
abatement, as in Missouri, and a. trial upon the 
issues presented by the pleadings results in favor 
of the defendant, then the rule which is applicable 
to all cases prevails, namely, that, unless there 
is a statute expressly authorizing the allowance 
of attorney's fees, none can be awarded by the 
Court.'' 
''There is, therefore, no reason why Courts 
should depart from the salutary rule which au-
thorizes the allowance of costs and expenses that 
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are provided by the usual so-called cost statutes. 
In addition to that, no costs should be allowed ex-
cept "'"hen expressly authorized by statute. The 
Courts of this state are always open to all for the 
redress of grievanee8 and the protection of legal 
rig·hts, and in our judgment they should refrain 
from allo,Ying the imposition of costs and ex-
penses upon the losing party except such as are 
provided for by statute and such as by the con-
census of the opinions of the Courts by long and 
uniform usage have been allowed in certain cases 
as necessary for the protection of legal rights. 
In our judgment such is not the case here.'' 
(Our italics.) 
The text books and encyclopedias have considered 
the question of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation 
as damages, and, except when the items fall within the 
subdivisions above referred to, are unanimous in dis-
allowing such claims. 
17 C. J. 807, Section 133lays down the rule as 
follows: 
''Expenses of Litigation and Attorneys' Fees. 
(a) In General. Apart from the sums allowable 
and taxed as costs, there can, as a general rule, be 
no recovery as damages of the costs and expenses 
of litigation, or expenditures for counsel fees. 
In cases of civil injury or breach of contract, in 
which there is no fraud, willful negligence, or 
malice, the Courts have considered that an award 
of the costs in the action is sufficient to cover 
expenses of litigation and make no allowance for 
time, indirect loss, and annoyance. 
''By statute in some jurisdictions provision 
is made for the allowance of the expenses of liti-
gation as damages in certain cases. ''Contractual 
provisions. Expenditures made for attorney's 
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fees in an action based on a contract containing a 
stipulation for such fees are in the nature of spe-
cial damages incidental to the breach· of the con-
tract, which, according to the· terms of the con-
tract, are to be compensated for in addition to a 
recovery of the principal sum due.'' 
Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Edition, Section 299, 
page 463, announces the rule as follows : 
''We have seen that in order to recover com-
plete compensation, the plaintiff should, in case 
he is successful, be allowed the expenses of liti-
gation. Nevertheless, the general rule is that 
counsel fees are not recoverable as damages. The 
law a'vards to the successful party his taxable 
costs, but the fees which he pays to counselors 
are not taken into consideration. (Citing cases.) 
In general the law considers the taxed costs as 
the only damages which a party sustains by the 
defense of a suit against him and these he recovers 
by judgment in his favor." 
Section 233 of the same volume on page 466 is as 
follows: 
" * * * It is, however, firmly established that 
counsel fees cannot be included in compensatory 
damages, at least where there was no malice 
or oppression.'' (Citing many cases.) 
The same work, section 234, page 470, reads: 
'' * · * * And accordingly, by the better opin-
ion, no inquiry into counsel fees should be allowed, 
even in those actions ·of tort in which the jury 
may give exemplary damages." 
(Our Italics.). 
In American Juris prudence, Volume 15, Sec-
tion 154, page 550, the rule is laid down to the 
same effect. 
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There can be no question but that exemplary dam-
ages cannot be claimed in this action, because it is neith-
er pleaded nor proved. 
Rugg Ys. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 Pac. 54. 
Falkenberg Ys. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 264 Pac. 
1008. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered the 
question here presented, and in Pittsburg M. & Invest-
ment Company Ys. Cook, 1 Pac. 2nd 665 says: 
''The remedy and . measure of damages, as 
provided by Section 6242, C. 0. S. 1921, for fail-
ure to release a mortgage is exclusive. Damages 
thereby provided, cannot be recovered, nor can 
recovery be had 'vhen provisions of the statute 
have not been complied with.'' 
Morrill vs. Title Guaranty Company, 94 
Wash. 258, 163 Pac. 733. 
Stapley vs. Rogers, 25 Ari~. 308, 216 Pac. 
1072, in the course of an opinion disallowing at-
torney's fees the Court says·: 
''It is difficult to determine upon what theory 
the Court entered judgment for $75.00 attorney's 
fees. The item is not taxed as costs and there is 
no allegation in the answer upon which to base it 
nor is there any evidence to support such a charge. 
We know of no rule nor of any statute that would 
authorize the allowance of attorney's fees to the 
winning party to be taxed against the loser. * * * 
Since no law nor authority exists that would 
authorize the entry of judgment for attorney's 
fees, it was error for the Court to enter such a 
judgment.'' 
Scurich vs. Ryan (California) 113 Pac. 123 
is another attorney's fee case, and in the course 
of the opinion is found the following: ''By con-
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ceding that he is entitled to a judgment, and leav-
ing out attorney's fees, which are not a proper 
element of damages, (Miller vs. Kehoe, 107 Cal. 
340, 40 Pac. 485 ; Sanger vs. Ryan, 122 Cal. 52, 
54 Pac. 522) it must be held that the verdict is 
excessive.'' 
Boob vs. Hall, (California) 40 Pac. 117, is a 
case wherein an attorney's fee was attempted in 
the foreclosure of a mortgage. There was no 
provision for attorney's fees in the contract, and 
in considering an assignment of errors based 
upon the allowance of $400.00 for counsel serv-
ices the Court said : 
"Neither the prayer in the complaint for 
its allowance nor the avertment of the amount 
\vhich would be reasonable can supply the neces-
sity of a direct averment that an attorney's fee 
had been agreed to be paid by the mortgagor. The 
motion to dismiss the appeal is denied, and the 
cause is remanded to the superior Court, with di-
rections to modify the judgment by excluding 
therefrom the amount included therein for attor-
ney's fees, and, \Vhen so modified, the judgment 
will stand affirmed.'' 
Avalon Construction Corporation vs. Kirch 
Holding Company (N.Y.) 175 N. E. 651. In the 
course of the opinion, is found the following: 
''Another i tern occurring in the bill of expenses 
occasioned to defendant is the item for $3,000.00 
for legal services. This item chiefly consists of 
charges made or to be made by defendant's own 
attorney for services in conducting this litiga-
tion. The legal charges which the plaintiff must 
pay to the defendant in this action, if any, will 
be comprehended in defendant's bill of costs. 
There is no basis for including them in the dam-
ages which the defendant may recover. Other 
items appearing in the expense account may or 
may not be recovered.'' 
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A most enlightening discussion of the subject in 
hand is found in the case of J. Abraham Guay, Executor, 
vs. Brotherhood Building Association, (New Hampshire) 
177 Atl. 409. This 'vas an action to have the stockhold-
ers of a certain domestic corporation adjudged liable for 
its note given to plaintiff's testatrix. All of the ques-
tions, except that of damages recoverable in recoupment 
because of premature foreclosure by the testatrix of the 
mortgage securing the note, were disposed of in a former 
opinion. The case was sent back to the master who made 
two further reports in accordance with which the Court 
entered judgment, and in the course of its opinion is 
found the following discussion with respect to attorney's 
fees: 
''The second exception is to the refusal of 
the master to allow as damages the counsel fees 
incurred by the defendants in maintaining their 
rights against the premature foreclosure by the 
plaintiff's testatrix. It is not enough to say that 
the foreclosure was wrongful, illegal, or tortious. 
Ordinarily, one suffering from such a wrong can-
not recover the counsel fees incurred in resistance 
of it, but will be limited to the attorney fee allowed 
by statute to be taxed as costs. * * * '' 
''Counsel fees other than statutory costs have 
been allowed under certain classifications. They 
include: 
'' (1) Cases of enforcement of judicial author-
ity, as where misconduct of a party amounting to 
contempt of court has caused the opposing party 
to incur counsel fees (Barber vs. George R. Jones 
Shoe Co., 80 N. H. 507, 511, 512, 120 A. 80), or 
where a person retains possession of property 
after a judicial determination of the wrongful 
character of his possession, thus forcing the party 
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wronged to the expense of further proceedings to 
recove;r possession or otherwise enforce his rights. 
Even in the second proceeding to enforce rights 
judicially declared in a prior action, the wronged 
party is not allowed anything for counsel fees in 
the first litigation. His only right as to counsel 
fees in the earlier proceeding is to have the statu-
tory costs taxed therein. 
"(2) Counsel fees other than those permitted 
by statute may be allowed by the court as the 
price of terms. Thus they may be taxed against 
the applicant for a new trial in some cases as 
ternis for the granting of the motion. And a party 
guilty of misconduct in consequence of which a 
mistrial is ordered may properly be required to 
pay counsel fees to the opposing party as the 
price of another trial. 
'' ( 3) Counsel fees may be allowed as dam-
ages in cases where there is contractual liability. 
Such liability may exist where the contract is 
to be interpreted as expressly providing for their 
payment, as in injunction bonds.'' 
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. vs. Evatt Const. 
Co. (Mass.) 152 N. E. 715. 
''The contention of the contractor that it is 
entitled to be awarded counsel fees incurred can-
not be sustained. It is a general rule that taxable 
costs recovered by the prevailing party are con-
sidered full compensation for the expense of con-
ducting the litigation, even if such costs are in 
fact wholly inadequate. Barnard vs. Poor, 21 
Pick, 378; Guild vs. Guild, 2 Mete. 229, Henry vs. 
Davis, 123 Mass. 345. Notwithstanding this gen-
era] rule it has been held that there are certain 
exceptions. In Inhabitants of Westfield vs. Mayo, 
122 Mass. 100, 23 Am. Rep. 292, an action of tort 
to rec?ver the amount of a judgment paid by the 
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plaintiff to one who had sustained personal in-
juries on a highway which the plaintiff was bound 
to keep in repair, it was held that the defendant, 
having negligently created the obstruction in the 
way, and having been notified to defend the ac-
tion, was liable to the plaintiff for the amount of 
the judgment, and also for the reasonable ex-
penses of the suit including counsel fees. It was 
there said, at page 105: 
Sears vs. Nahant, (Mass.) 102 N. E. 491. In 
this case the Court considered the question of 
attorney's fees and made several distinctions, but 
concluded that attorney's fees were not proper 
charges and sustained the ruling of the lower 
Court. 
203. 
] 1itzgerald vs. Heady, (Mass.) 113 N. E. 844. 
Brown vs. Kidwell, (Kansas) 244 Pac. 236. 
Spencer vs. Murphy, (Colo.) 41 Pac. 841. 
Flanders vs. Tweed, 82 U. S. 450, 21 L. Ed. 
It clearly appears from the evidence introduced on 
the part of plaintiff that upon his failure to agree with 
appellant he demanded a discharge of his mortgages, 
and that at once appellant agreed that such discharge 
would come immediately upon payment to it of its costs 
and expenses, and appellant believes that in view of 
the fact that it was in good faith entitled to a return of 
the expenditure made by it on behalf of plaintiff that no 
damage in the nature of attorney's fees could properly be 
ass·essed against it, and that the trial Court was in error 
when it allowed any proof to be made as to attorn·ey's 
fees in the light of the claims of appellant which were 
clearly made in good faith:, and which appellant pleaded 
in its answer and which the court struck out, thereby 
prejudicing appellant. 
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Plaintiff has relied very extensively upon the case 
of Kelly vs. Narregang_Investment Company, 41 S.Dak. 
222, 170 N. W. 131, and this case seems to be the base from 
which has grown the consideration of attorney's fees 
in cases of the type of the one at bar. 
rrhe case of Mathieu vs. Boston, also a South Dakota 
case, found_ in 216 N. W. 361, and decided eleven years 
later than the Kelly case, considers the question of good 
faith on the part of the mortgagee in demanding further 
and additional compensation. This was an action 
brought by plaintiffs and appellants, as owners of cer-
tain lands mortgaged to secure a debt of $8,000.00 to re-
spondent. After certain payments had been made there-
on, $1,600.00 was tendered in full satisfaction of the 
mortgage, which was refused because the respondent 
believed that he was entitled to a sum in excess of $1,-
800.00. At the trial, the Court instructed the jury that 
the section of the South Dakota statute providing for 
damages and penalties for failure to release a mortgage 
when full payment was made did not apply where the 
holder of the mortgage refused to discharge, relying in 
good faith, even though mistakenly, upon some supposed 
legal rights. In the Mathieu case the defendant believed 
he was entitled to more money. The Court held other-
wise but, notwithstanding that fact, sustained the judg-
ment of the lower Court, denying all damages, including 
attorney fees, and in the course of the opinion, referring 
to the section of the statute providing for penalties and 
damages for failure to release, says : 
''The foregoing section is almost identical in 
language with subdivision 6 of Section 1735 of 
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the Civil Code of Dakota Territory, quoted by 
Justice Carland in Kronebusch vs. Raumin, 6 
Dak. 243, 42 N. W. 656. Therein our territorial 
Supreme Court said: 'If, before he (the mort-
gagee) is satisfied of the correctness of the 
amount, a demand is made upon him for a dis-
charge of the mortgage, and he refuses, and action 
is brought by the mortgagor for the penalty, we 
should hold that, if he could show that his refusal 
was in good faith, and made in the honest belief 
that the mortgage was not entitled to be discharg-
ed, he would not be liable to the penalty, as the re-
fusal of the mortgagee or his representative, un-
der subdivision 6 of our statute, must be inten-
tional and willful in order to incur the penalty.' 
''True, the foregoing quotation from Krone-
busch vs. Raumin, supra, is mere dicta; but, 
in Jones on Mortgages, 7th ed. vol. 2, Section 991, 
the learned author states that, 'the mortgagee is 
not bound, upon tender of payment, to determine 
doubtful questions at his peril, and he is not gen-
erally held liable to the statutory penalty if his 
refusal is made in good faith and in the honest 
belief that he is not bound to accept the tender.' 
' ' See also Section 982 of the Title, ' Mort-
gages,' 41 C. J. 819. 
"It is urged by appellant that this construc-
tion of our statute calls for reading into it a pro-
viso not contained within its language. This ob-
jection has heretofore been considered by the 
courts. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in 
Schlliilacher vs. Falter, 113 Wis. 563, 89 N. W. 
485, in construing Section 2256 of the Revised 
Statutes of Wisconsin says: 'Although that sec-
tion does not provide, in terms, that the failure to 
discharge must be a willful or malicious one, it 
is very evident that it was not enacted to punish 
honest mistakes. A statute in almost the iden-
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tical language. of. our. section has been construed 
many times by. the Supreme, Court of Michigan; 
and the substance of the decisions in that state 
is that where there is no intentional wrong in the 
refusal to discharge, but rather, a reliance in good 
faith upon some supposed legal right, the penalty 
will not be imposed, even· though the supposed 
right may be found not to exist.' " 
It is submitted that if the trial Court had not been 
imbued with the zeal of a crusader to award damages 
to the plaintiff' and had been· willing to listen to the 
testimony which appellant would have. produced and 
had not stricken from its answer its allegations upon 
which such proof 'vould have been admitted, the Court 
would have been presented with the same type of testi-
money of. which the Court in the Mathieu case says: 
''The merest reading of the testimony in the 
present case shows that the defendant, in refusing 
to discharge, 'vas acting in the honest belief that 
his mortgage was still unpaid and under the ad-
vice of counsel. ' ' 
See also Parkes vs. Parker, 57 Mich. 57, 23 
N. W. 458.· 
Haubert vs. Haworth, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 123. 
American National Bank vs. Jordan, 123 
Okla. 165, 254 P. 706. 
First National Bank· vs. Elam, 126 Okla. 93, 
258 Pac. 892. 
Myer vs .. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, 29 Am. R. 553. 
Penalty under sec. 6369 for failure to release a mort-
gage should not be imposed for failure to release a 
mortgage which· has been satisfied, where facts indicate 
a .substantial controversy. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
Harding, et ux, vs. Home Investment & Sav-
ings Company, 49 Idaho 64, 286 Pac. 920. 
In the rase of Smith vs. Colson, 31 Okla., 703, 
123 Pac. 149, it is said: 
dIn an action by the mortgagor against a 
mortgagee to recoYer under Section 3057, Ind. Ter. 
Statute, for the mortgagee's failure to acknowl-
edge satisfaction of a mortgage as required by 
-said statute, it is a competent defense for the 
mortg·agee to show that there was a controversy 
between him and the mortgagor as to whether 
the mortgage debt had been paid, and upon sub-
stantial grounds and in good faith, he refused to 
satisfy the mortgage, believing that the mort-
. gage debt or part thereof had not been paid, and 
that he is entitled to recover same; and where 
there is evidence tending to support this issue of 
defense, it was error for the Court to refuse an 
instruction thereon, correctly stating the law ap-
plicable to such issue.'' 
In the Colson case the Court cited with approval: 
Burrows vs. Bangs, 34 Mich. 304. 
Scott vs. Field, 7 5 Ala. 419. 
Schumacher vs. Falter, 113 Wis. '563, 89 N. 
w. 485. 
The Burrows case is particularly interesting because 
the opinion was written by Judge Cooley, who disposes 
·of the question of damages and attorney's fees as fol-
lows: 
"But as there has been an honest difference 
of opinion between these parties regarding their 
rights, we do not think the defendant is subject 
to the statutory penalty for not discharging the 
mortgage.'' 
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Continental Bank vs. Kowalsky, (Mich.) 225 N. W. 
496 held that where a mortgagee refused tender of an 
amount due on a mortgage, did not act in bad faith or 
without an honest belief that the amount did not satisfy 
the lien, the penalty provided in Section 11745, Compiled 
Laws of 1915, did not apply. 
See also Shelton vs. Wilson, 264 N. W. 854. 
McQueen vs. First National Bank of W etump-
ka, (Ala.) 160 So. 723. 
In Stumph vs. vVheat Belt Building & Loan Ass'n 
of Pratt, 148 Kan. 25, 79 Pac. 2nd 896, the Court holds 
that a mortgagor, suing to compel a mortgagee to re-
lease a real estate mortgage, was not entitled as a mat-
ter of right or statute to a judgment for statutory pen-
alty or for attorney's fees, notwithstanding that the 
debt secured was paid and the mortgage was subject 
to be released where there was a bona fide controversy 
between the parties as to whether the debt had in fact 
been paid, and in arriving at this conclusion in the course 
of its opinion the Court said : 
''With reference to the cross appeal, whether 
the appellee "\vas entitled to statutory damages and 
attorney's fees depended in large part on there 
being bona fide controversy between the parties. 
The trial Court held against the association but 
that did not mean there 'vas no claim in good 
faith by it. The controversy grew out of a mat-
ter on which other Courts had decided both ways 
and on which this Court had not ruled. We think 
that under Parkhurst vs. National Bank, 53 
Kan. 136, 35 Pac. 1116, the trial Court's ruling 
was correct. '' 
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The Supreme Court of Oregon had occasion to pass 
upon the same question presented, and in the case of 
Knudson YS. Knudson, 275 Pac. 663, it was decided that 
a refusal to enter satisfaction of a mortgage did not cre-
ate liability for $100.00 in addition to actual damages 
under Oregon I.ja"r 9891, and at the same time laid down· 
the rule, which seems to be universal in this line of cases, 
that a statute providing for such damages is a penal 
statute and is to be strictly construed. 
Respondent is relying· upon the statute of Utah above 
quoted to justify the judgment in his behalf for $200.00 
attorney's fees ·and has cited the Kelly case supra and the 
Cocking case in 1iontana in 213 Pac. 594, as justification 
for its position. AR authority for its claim that any 
damage sustained may contain attorney's fees, we have 
always felt that mandantus was a little different type 
of procedure, and we are inclined to the belief that even 
the mandamus decision in Utah in the Creer case, 96 
Utah 1:- 80 Pac. 2nd 914, is distinguishable for that rea-
son. It would take a hardy advocate, indeed, to justify 
any other decision than that which was rendered in the 
case of Cornelius vs. United States Building & Loan 
Association, 50 Idaho 1, 292 Pac. 243, one of the cases 
upon which respondent relies. This was the case involv-
ing usury, and of course included not only the possibility 
of damage through violation of the law of the State of 
Idaho with respect to the rate of interest, but also car-
ried the question of damage for failure to release, and 
no question there is presented as to good faith in such 
refusal. 
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Appellant believes that at no time was the plaintiff 
justified in bringing the action which he brought, be-
cause appellant V{as always ready and willing to release 
the mortgages upon being made whole for its actual ex-
penses, and an outstanding evidence of the unfairness 
of plaintiff's position is the fact that he was willing 
to accept the benefit secured to him through the insur-
ance procured by appellant and yet unwilling to reim-
burse appellant for the premiums paid in his behalf, not 
to mention the other expenditures 'vhich have heretofore 
been recited, all ·of which were incurred at plaintiff's 
request. 
Appellant therefore submits: 
1. When respondent demanded release of his mort-
gages,, there was no longer any obligation from appellant 
to him to advance him money, even if proper compliance 
with F. H. A. regulations had been had, and approval 
of construction to agreed degrees had and evidenced. 
2. There is no damage sho"\vn to respondent sup-
ported by any substantial or responsible evidence. 
3. Respondent here, plaintiff below, did not com-
ply 'vith his contract in any respect, and at no time was 
his construction at the 16th East house sufficiently ad-
vanced to entitle him to any advancements, and there 
was no F. H. A. inspection and approval which ever 
would have justified appellant in giving him any money 
under the alleged terms of the agreement between the 
parties. 
4. .Lt\.ppellant believes that it was honestly entitled 
as a condition precedent to the release of mortgages to 
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demand and receive from respondent Swaner the money 
"'"hich it had expended in his behalf and for his benefit, 
and that the action of the trial Court in refusing to allow 
it to plead and prove such expenditures was highly pre-
judicial to it. 
5. That prejudicial error having been committed 
against appellant by the trial Court in its rulings at the 
trial on the pleadings and on the admission of evidence, 
and in entering judgment against appellant and in favor 
of respondent and in refusing to grant appellant a new 
trial, the judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully. submitted, 
DAN B. SHIELDS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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~Form No. 2200 
rlsed 1au. 15, 1938) 
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION 
·~ 
,-~. 
MEMORANDUM OF COMPLIANCE INSPEti'ION 
In . f . FHA N S~- o-oJ/37~ leetl?J 8eonstruet10n Caseff. ----------------- • Cl. ~· ~ . ~-· -·--·--~!---~---~--~-~·---~-----~------··----------- ------~-~·-----·-~-.~~~-.-(City or town) (State) 
/~-~I <f . . 
1 made on---------·-------~----, 193.a.., and reveals that the work then 
ipleted- J-
::: »:u J passed the ____________ {_ __________________________ inspection. 
Subject to correction and reinspection of-
.... ------------~----------------·------·------------------~-~---~-----------~----------~--·-·--· 
~--------------------------------------------·--------------------------------------AW·~------·--··· 
···-·----·-------~----------------~-------·--------------·----·-----------------·-------·-·-------
····-------------·-------·---··-·--------------------------------·-----------------·---···------------· 
··--------------------------~--~---··----·------------------~----------------------·-------------~~-
rill be more explicitly set forth in a Compliance Inspection Report, copy of 
~ch will shortly be mailed to applicant mortgagee. 
Corrected items must be left uncovered and visible for reinspection and 
sible recorre·ction, else .the removal of coveringt)d concealing materials may 
required. I 0) If K £. ~ Bn t{ <G\'" S "-- By -------~--<fuiii.~)---------· Impe~or. 
------------~ _ --------------~--------------' Chtef Archttectural Supervuor. 
~I JOlt FHA INSPECTOR: 
ThJs form shall be completed in duplicate. The original shall be posted conspicuously at.the site of 
ltructlon. Duplicate copy shall be forwarded to thtt IDSUring Office with Compliance InspectioD 
IOrt, . 16-4469 V, & GO'YDJfJIIIift ,._umKe....,.. 
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ewaner 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTION REPORT 
Type of Inspection: __ __§_2-00:-::'4~3...:..;72~--_J 
(Serial number) 
D First Required. 0 Second Required. D Third Required. 0 Additional or Optional. 0 Repair, 
f) Alternate Fii-st. 
Property address E .fid.u . ..o!'-1.6__E....,.N.&--a.t:...l7 •• .S.oll.th City ______ ,_C.E~t~; ke State --..w.J~.Sw..J~ 
Name of contractor _____________ .o_wne.r. ________________________ _ 
NOTE.-The term "approved drawings and speci.fi.cations," used below means those drawings and specifications whifi 
approved by the Federal Housing Administration at the time Commitment for Insurance was issued in the case of the a 
bered application~ together with subsequent changes approved by the Chief Underwriter. 
WORK COMPLETED 
X Indicates work entirely completed. vIndicates work in progress or partially complete. 
[2g Excavation 
~Footings 
Gt Foundation, walls, piers 
0 Backfill 
CROSS OUT WORK NOT REQUmED 
0 Heating (rough-in) D Floor finishing 
D Elec. wiring (rough-in) D Trim, doors, sash 
D Insulation 0 Weatherstrip 
D Septic tank D Hardware 
0 Grading 
OWalks 
D Driveway 
D Sodding Ill Floor construction 
111 Exterior walls 
0 Roof construction 
D Roofing in place 
0 Sheet metal 
0 Partitions 
D Basement floor slab 0 Calking 
0 Lathing and plaster base D Interior paint 
D Plumbing fixtures D Decorating 
D Tile work D Elec. fixtures 
D Plastering 0 Exterior paint 
D Heating~fixtures D Screens 
0 Utilities installed an 
proved by authoritiel 
0 Utilities connected · 
0 Work satisfactorily com 
and building is ready~ 
cupancy (attach two 
graphic prints) 0 Plumbing (rough-in) 
0 No~e 
D D Detached garage 
INCOMPLET~ WORK OR DEFECTIVE 1.\IATERIALS 
(LIST ITEMS, D' ANY) 
Concrete to be checked i'or f'reez.inJ a!'ter it hc..f: .1ad JftOre time to se.t up. 
, 
How does this incomplete work or defective materials affect the cost estimate or rating _of physica~ security?l 
---.,..--'-------~ 
~None VARIATIONS FROM APPROVED DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
(ALSO INCLUDE OMITTED ITEMS) 
How do these variations affect the cost estimate or rating of physical security? 
Have you ever inspected this property before, other than F. H. A. inspections? --~~----
I 
.I 
and for whom --------------·-------------------------------------------------· ------ · 
CERTIFICATION: I, the undersigned, have read Section 612 (a) of the Natio~al Housing Act, as amended, and do here 
tify that I have carefully inspected this property, that I have noted above all defective work and variations from appl'\lvedthiJ 
and specifications which have come to my attention, that to the best of my--knowledge and belief the statements made 'in 
are correct, end t~t I have no personal interest, present or prospective, in the property, applicant, or proceeds of mo~ge. 
. ., 
(Date) ----------~c c :~~~:l-.. ~~1.--~~~~~-----
Examined this date. 
(Date) -----Beeetl~i:.-2-;---l$58------
. Construction finally approved·----~-----, 
· - · (Date) 
(Signed) -=--------------
. · .• Chief Underwriter. 
(Signed) --------------------~----------~ 
, · . .Inspector 0 Staff. 0 Fee. 0 Per 
0 Construction approved to date 
0 Construction not approved . Gl Construction approved to date subject to correct! 
defective work 
D Additi~on~a~· lS.PJ~ioli-~· 
D Con · 
.... - ,._. ~·nc. 16-&Ut 2051. Compliance Inspection Report 
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